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I -Introduction
Egypt is a developing country and is classified by the World Bank as the
51
st among the poorest countries. The poverty level is 35.88% in urban
areas and 34.1% in rural areas, i.e. one third of the population can not
secure their basic needs
*.
Does this have any bearing on human rights?
The traditional answer is that poverty prevents the enjoyment of human
rights. It in itself is a denial of the basic material conditions of life, and of
the host of economic and social rights that include healthy food, safe
environment, adequate housing, etc. Besides, the everyday burdens of the
poor prevent them from paying attention to the fundamental human rights
issues (such as the rights to the freedom of opinion, expression,
conscience, association, assembly, participation, etc.) that play a crucial
role in determining the shares of the haves and the have-nots in the
wealth of the nation.
Does the denial of human rights lead to poverty, or to more poverty?
What is the relationship between efforts to combat or ameliorate poverty
and human rights?
Or in general terms what is the relationship between development and
human rights?
Is it a unidirectional relationship, i.e. successful development provides the
preconditions of the enjoyment of human rights, or it also goes the other
way round?
The most articulate expression of the link between development and
human rights in Egypt is the “Toshky” project. It is a mega-project that
aims at changing the economic geography of Egypt by creating a new
Nile delta. This delta is planned to add 2.4 million feddans of agricultural
land (doubling the national income) and 24 new cities thus increasing the
inhabited area from 3% to 12%. In this sense “Toshky” is a colossal
developmental project that could provide much to the common good of
the Egyptians, and could also be a drain of limited resources or a
catastrophe inhibiting growth for decades. The final word on this is to
scientific feasibility studies.
                                                          
*  Comprehensive Development in Egypt Report, Center for the Study of the study of
Developing Countries, Cairo University, 1998.3
Such project could have been an occasion for involving scientists,
experts, intellectuals, political forces, civil society institutions (such as
the trade unions and NGOs) in discussing Egypt’s development prospects
for the next century. It could have been an occasion for mobilizing
society to participate in development and for specifying the project’s
conditions of success and the dangers to be heeded.
Yet, what happened was the exact opposite. The decision to implement
the project was taken from above without revealing its feasibility studies.
There was a media blackout on all scientific opinions in opposition to the
project, except in the opposition press. The project was not discussed in
the parliament (although the ruling party has a majority of over 90% in
it), nor was it discussed in the parliament’s specialized committees
concerned. The public opinion was kept in the dark on the project’s
funding sources though the government has already spent one billion and
125 million Egyptian pounds on the almost-finished first stage. Lately,
three years after work began in the project, the former Prime Minister
confessed that it was brought before the parliament as part of the public
budget under a “code number”
* which even the speaker of the parliament
(one of the leaders of the ruling party) did not know!!
**
Is  “Toshky” a military secret that should be shrouded in secrecy and
concealment so that its budget would not be leaked to the enemies of the
government in the ranks of the opposition? Does the state budget allow
for the four billion pounds needed for this project? Are the returns of the
project comparable to such massive sum? Does the Egyptian economy,
just out of “intensive care”, contain such huge liquid assets?
***
We will notice here that these questions and their probable answers can
not be related to “military secrets,” religion, gender, or even terrorist
groups – the interdictions used as pretext for denying the freedom of
opinion and the right of participation. Their only frame of reference is
economics. Yet, these questions remain unanswered. When another editor
of Al-Wafd (Abbas Tarabily) asked them two years ago the then Prime
Minister charged him with treason!
                                                          
* See the editorial of Al-Wafd, December 30
th, 1999, based on a telephone interview
with the former Prime Minister. (To this moment neither the former or the existing
prime ministers, or the speaker of the parliament have retracted any of this.)
** See interview with Dr. Fathi Sorour, the speaker of the parliament in Al-Wafd,
November 18
th, 1999.
*** Saiid Abdel-Khalek, editor-in-chief of Al-Wafd. See the above-mentioned editorial.4
We believe that such a connection between economics and treason is the
other side of denying the right to participate in the planning,
administration, supervision, and distributing the returns of development.
This is a necessary introduction before moving to survey the principal
features of the human rights condition in Egypt and determine whether
there exist the institutional and legislative arrangement necessary for
advancement, development and progress.5
II- Characteristics of the Political,
Legal and Constitutional Systems
The successive Egyptian constitutions, from that of 1952 to the current
adopted in 1971, have always concentrated powers in the hands of the
executive, and particularly in the hands of the head of state. The
constitution merged all privileges and powers enjoyed by the head of
state in both the parliamentary and presidential systems, to establish a
unique system based on the political unaccountability of the head of state
while enjoying powers that surpass those of the head of state in
presidential regimes. Hence, the Egyptian constitution has practically
appended both the executive and the legislative powers to the presidential
institution. The legislative authority has become so weak as to be unable
to oversee the government on the one hand, and to be ready to accept
whatever decisions or legislation the executive sees fit.
Unlimited Power:
The President of the Republic has the right to appoint and dismiss the
Prime Minister and his deputies, the ministers and their deputies (Article
141 of the Constitution). However, this does not contradict with the
members of the government being collectively responsible to the
parliament!! (Article 127).
Furthermore, the President of the Republic preserves the right to dissolve
the People’s Assembly (the parliament) when necessary, after a relevant
public referendum (Article 136). This Article does not place any
restrictions by virtue of which the necessity to dissolve the Parliament is
defined.
The President of the Republic also has the right to submit the conflict
between the government and the parliament to a referendum (Article
127).
Moreover, the constitution has granted the President of the Republic, by
virtue of article 74, the right to take whatever expeditious measures he
deems appropriate to face any hazards that would threaten national unity
or the integrity of the nation, or obstruct the state institutions from
performing their constitutional role. The constitution, however, has not
placed any restrictions on such measures or their limits, other than the6
president having to address the nation and holding a referendum on these
measures within 60 days from the date of their entry into force.
In addition, the President of the Republic has the right to issue decrees
with the power of law in the absence of the parliament according to
Article 147 of the Constitution, or under authorization by the parliament
(Article 108).
On top of this, the President of the Republic possesses vast powers upon
the declaration of a state of emergency, as it is the President who declares
or terminates the state of emergency, although he may not extend the
state of emergency without the consent of the Parliament.
It is known that Egypt will remain till May 2000 under the state of
emergency that has gone uninterrupted for more than 48 years, save for
five years. The last declaration of the state of emergency took place in
October 1981, following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat.
Since then, it has been routinely renewed.
Constitutional Guarantees:
One could say that the current Egyptian constitution provides the
minimum standards for guaranteeing the enjoyment of human rights, as it
includes clear references to a wide array of rights. These rights include:
equality between citizens before the law; guaranteeing the freedom of
opinion, expression, creation and scientific research; freedom of the
press, printing and publishing; freedom of information; freedom of belief;
freedom of practicing religious rites; and the right to form associations,
trade unions and federations. The constitution has further provided that
personal freedom is a natural and inalienable right. Except in cases of
flagrante delicto or according to a writ by the competent judge or the
Prosecution Office, no one may be arrested, searched, imprisoned,
deprived of liberty or deprived of his right to liberty of movement.
Although the constitution is void of any articles that explicitly prohibit
torture, this prohibition is implicitly stated in Article 42, which stipulates
that any citizen arrested, imprisoned, or deprived of liberty shall be
treated in a manner that preserves his dignity as a human being, and shall
not be harmed physically or morally. Article 42 also adds that any
statement proven to be made by a citizen under duress of any of the
aforementioned, or the threat thereof, shall be deemed invalid.
Article 57 of the constitution provides that any infringement on the
personal freedom or the sanctity of private life or other public rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, shall be considered a crime that7
is not subject to statutory limitations. Moreover, the state shall guarantee
fair compensation to the aggrieved.
The legal rights of the citizens appear in more than one article of the
constitution: the “presumption of innocence” is guaranteed by Article 67,
which states that the accused is innocent until proven guilty by a court of
law where he is guaranteed the means to defend himself. The Article
added that anyone accused of a felony should have an attorney to defend
him. Article 69 provides that the accused can defend himself either in
person or by proxy. For those who cannot financially afford it, the law
provides the means to resort to court and defend their rights.
Also in relation to this, the constitution provides a number of guarantees
for the right to a fair trial. Public hearing is warranted by Article 168; the
independence of the judiciary and the independence and immunity of
judges from removal are guaranteed by Articles 165, 166 and 168; and
the right to judicial review and appeal is granted by Article 71. Article 68
of the constitution furthermore asserts that litigation is a right granted to
all, and all citizens have the right to recourse to the respective competent
judge.
The constitution protects as well the privacy of citizens and the freedom
of private life, and warrants certain guarantees to the freedom of
movement, residence and travel. It also provides the right of asylum to
foreigners persecuted on the ground of their defense of the interests of the
peoples, human rights, peace or justice. Article 53 of the constitution
prohibits the extradition of political refugees.
As regards economic and social rights, the constitution grants the right to
work (Article 13) and the enjoyment of social and health care, and
pensions for the disabled and senior citizens. The constitution makes
education compulsory in the primary education stage (article 180) and
free in all stages in public educational institutions (Article 20). It also
safeguards public and private property (Articles 33, 34, 35 and 36).
However, the Egyptian constitution has left out any provision to provide
for the right to peaceful strike.
Moreover, the constitution has introduced a system for the judicial
supervision of the supremacy of such constitutional guarantees, by
establishing the High Constitutional Court, which is considered an
autonomous judicial body, entrusted with the judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws.8
Since the dissolution of political parties, pursuant to a resolution by the
Revolutionary Command Council in 1953 until 1976 Egypt lived under a
single political organization, that has taken many forms and names,
starting with the Liberation Authority, to the National Union, to the Arab
Socialist Union.
Since 1976, a new experience has started by adopting the restricted
multiparty system. Three platforms were established from inside the
Socialist Union, which turned, by presidential will, into political parties
in 1977. Pursuant to this orientation, a constitutional amendment was
made to consider pluralism the basis of the Egyptian political system.
Yet, the constitution did not include any explicit provision to guarantee
the freedom to form and join political parties. The Law on Political
Parties no. 40 of 1977 came with many restrictions on the freedom to
form political parties which have almost done away with the substance of
this right. This is especially true given the conditions for licensing
political parties. For example, its principles and goals shall not contradict
with those of the July 23, 1952 revolution, or the May 15, 1971
revolution, or with the principles of the Islamic Law and the prerequisites
for maintaining social peace, national unity, the democratic socialist
system, and socialist gains. The law does not allow parties based on class,
religious or provincial bases. At the same time, the law requires that the
party’s platforms, policies and methods should be clearly distinct from all
existing parties – an impossible demand in the light of those other
conditions. In accordance with this prohibitive condition, the
overwhelming majority of the requests to found new parties has been
rejected: The Committee on Political Parties’ Affairs has since its
inception turned down over 38 requests to form new parties.
The impartiality of this committee is questioned, as most of its members
are members in the ruling National Democratic Party, the party of the
regime. Surveying the map of the political parties in Egypt today, we find
fourteen parties that have gained their legal legitimacy primarily either
from an initiative from above under Sadat or by means of judicial rulings.
The latter is the case of eight parties that the Committee on Political
Parties’ Affairs had refused to grant a legal license.
Although the Egyptian constitution recognizes the right of citizens to take
part in the conduct of public affairs through voting and standing for
election, it imposes strict limitations on nomination for presidency. It
provides that the president is chosen by popular referendum on a single
candidate, not the election of one from among several candidates. It
stipulates that the nomination for the post shall take place through the9
parliament and upon a motion by one third of its members. The candidate
stands for the vote of the people only after receiving the approval of a
two-thirds majority in the parliament. Under the sweeping majority of the
government party (or the President’s party) in parliament, these
conditions for candidacy ensure the elimination of any independent
candidate or a candidate from among the ranks of the opposition. This is
especially true given the historical heritage of manipulating parliamentary
elections (which are dominated by the Ministry of the Interior), and given
the violations to the equality of opportunity between candidates of the
ruling party and those of the opposition.
The provisions of the constitution do not provide any safeguards that
would prevent the manipulation of the voters’ will in the parliamentary
elections. Article 93 of the constitution gives the parliament, which is
dominated by the ruling party, an absolute power to decide on the
soundness of its membership. This power allows it to discard the results
of the investigations conducted by the highest judicial authorities in
Egypt, namely the Court of Cassation, which is entrusted with reviewing
objections against the results of the elections. Customarily, the parliament
dismisses the results of the investigations that prove the invalidity of its
members.
Acknowledging the safeguards granted by the Egyptian constitution to
human rights and public freedoms does not mean that the major problems
of human rights violations in Egypt are only related to the Egyptian
constitution’s position on the rotation of power through the ballot boxes,
the freedom of forming political parties or the right to strike. These
problems are more closely related to two concerns:
First: the legal frame organizing all rights and freedoms has largely
restricted these rights and freedoms, to an extent that almost does away
with these constitutionally acknowledged rights or makes their exercise
impossible or difficult. As previously mentioned, this situation is
promoted by the huge imbalance between authorities, and the tyrannizing
of the executive over the legislative authority. The weakness of the latter
makes it always ready to pass all bills referred to it by the executive,
regardless of its conformity with the provisions of the constitution. This is
besides the wide-ranging authority of the President to issue decrees
having the force of law, whether in the absence of the parliament, or
according to authorization by the parliament.
Second: the state of emergency that has been uninterrupted since 1981,
by virtue of which the Emergency Law remains in force. This law was10
rightly described by the United Nations Human Rights Committee as a
second constitution. The Emergency Law implies the suspension of a
number of constitutional safeguards through the broad prerogatives
granted to the executive authority and the security forces. Hence it allows
the administrative detention of persons without having to adhere to the
constitutional and procedural guarantees concerning the apprehension of
suspects. It also allows restricting the freedom of assembly, movement
and choice of residence. In addition to searching persons and places
without being bound by the Criminal Procedure Code; ordering the
surveillance, seizure and impounding of personal correspondence,
newspapers, bulletins, publications, written materials and all other
methods of expression before publication.
Furthermore, this law allowed encroachment upon the judicial authority,
by establishing exceptional courts to judge on crimes committed in
violation of the emergency authority or crimes under public law referred
to it by orders of the President or a representative of his. Concerning the
formation of state security courts – emergency, the law allows that a
number of army officers be added by orders of the President or that they
be comprised in full of army officers in certain cases or regions.  Those
submitted to the state security courts – emergency do not have the right to
challenge the rulings before a higher court, and their verdicts are not final
unless being ratified by the President of the Republic himself or a
representative of his. In the course of the ratification process, the
President of the Republic has the right to commute the penalty, replace it
by a lesser one, cancel all or some of the penalties, stop the
implementation of the penalty, cancel the ruling and leave the case on
file, or order a retrial before another judicial circuit. This wastes any
worth of judicial rulings, and makes them subject to the will of the
executive authority.
Above all, the Emergency Law grants the President the right to refer any
crime punishable under the Penal Code to military courts. According to
this authority, the nineties have witnessed a surge in the numbers of
civilians referred to criminal courts: 1029 defendants (all civilians) in 34
cases, 94 of them sentenced to death, in 1992-9. It is noteworthy that
these trials were not confined to cases of violence and terrorism, but
expanded to include several politicians charged of attempting to revive
the banned Muslim Brothers group, or coordinating efforts to run for
parliamentary or syndicate elections, or requesting permission to form a
new party.11
The Egyptian government justifies the continuation of the state of
emergency since 1981 by the escalation of violence and terrorism.
However, the state of emergency and the overuse of the powers given by
the Emergency Law have resulted in the aggravation of a sense of
revenge and vindictiveness on the part of the armed Islamic groups. This
sense of vendetta manifested itself in the nineties in the broadening of the
targets of these groups. In addition to police officers and soldiers, the
Islamic armed groups targeted tourists, Copts, attempted the assassination
of a number of state figures, and inflicted great harm on unarmed
civilians through indiscriminate shooting or using explosives in crowded
places.
According to estimates by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights
(EOHR), the death toll of the bloody confrontation between the state and
the armed Islamic group in 1991-9 reached 1320, including 394 police
officers, soldiers and assistants; 500 persons suspected of belonging to
Islamic groups; 93 tourists; and 317 ordinary citizens, including 99
Copts
1.
Although the last two years have witnessed a noticeable decline in the
acts of violence and terrorism (as the death toll includes only 43), the
Egyptian government still insists on the preservation of the state of
emergency and continues to refer civilians to military courts.
                                                          
1Youssri Mustafa Abdel-Meguid, “The Power of Death and the Power of Life: The State’s
Responsibility in Violating the Right to Life”  a working paper presented at the Seventh Intellectual
Forum of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Cairo, December 1999.12
III- The Egyptian Government’s Attitude towards the
International Human Rights Instruments
and the UN Protection Mechanisms
In 1982 Egypt acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Egypt is also a state party to many
of the fundamental agreements on human rights, among them: the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967
supplementary protocol.
It should be noted that the Egyptian government did not join the first
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights that gives individuals the right to submit complaints to the UN
Human Rights Committee. Nor did the government declare that it
recognizes the competence of the Human Rights Committee -according to
Article 41 of the ICCPR- to receive and consider communications and
complaints from other states parties to the effect that Egypt does not
fulfill its obligations under the Covenant.
In the same vein, Egypt did not declare that it recognizes the competence
of the Committee against Torture (CAT), according to Article 21 of the
Convention against Torture, to receive and consider communications to
the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling
its obligations under the Convention. Nor did it declare that it recognizes
the competence of the Committee, according to Article 22 of the
Convention against Torture, to receive and consider communications
from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be
victims of a violation of the provisions of the Convention.
This means that the Egyptian government disapproves of the international
mechanisms that provide for the right of states and individuals to submit
complaints to the UN Human Rights Commission regarding its non-
compliance to its commitments according to agreements it had ratified.
This disapproval is manifest also in the government’s stance towards the
Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted on December 9th,13
1998, as Egypt’s representative to the UN submitted a memorandum to
the UN on behalf of 26 states declaring such reservations on the
Declaration as to effectively nullify its significance.  This position by the
government can not be detached from its increasing hostility towards the
human rights movement in Egypt. In December 1998, when the world
was preparing for celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the secretary general of the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights (the most prominent and earliest human
rights organizations in Egypt) was arrested. Wide calumniation campaign
was launched against the human rights movement as a whole. The reason:
the EOHR had published that summer a report on torture and collective
punishment of hundreds of citizens in the village of Koshah, Sohag in
upper Egypt. The government considers that communicating information
on its human rights record to international organizations and UN
committees and special rapporteurs as detrimental to the national image
and security.
In this context, the government seeks to hem in and undermine the
independence of human rights organizations through the Law on
Associations number 153 of 1999 that was passed in May. This law aims
in the first place at blocking all the legal outlets that allowed these
organizations to work away from the government’s grip on non-
governmental activities.
Moving to the status of international instruments in the Egyptian
legislation, we will notice first of all that presumably according to Article
151 of the Constitution agreements that have been concluded, ratified and
published in the Official Gazette after the approval of the People’s
Assembly (the parliament) have the force of law. Nonetheless, the
Egyptian Supreme Court (replaced later by the Higher Constitutional
Court) was of a different opinion. And thus, in a verdict issued on March
3
rd, 1975, the Higher Court judged that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, signed by Egypt, was no more than a nonbinding
recommendation, and that it did not have the same force as ratified
international agreements. Even as regards the latter, the Higher Court
considered that laws that contradict them are not to be deemed
unconstitutional, arguing that international agreements are not of the
same status or force as the Constitution and that they are not superior to
law. In effect, this verdict nullifies any obligatory force international
agreements may have, and obstructs the implementation of human rights
instruments.14
The prominent ruling by the State Security Court – Emergency of April
1987 concerning the train drivers’ strike stands alone in rightly
implementing Article 151 of the Constitution, and in applying the
provisions of the ICESCR to the case in a way that conforms with the
proper understanding of the Constitution and the human rights
instruments. The Court acquitted the defendants on the basis that the
indictment articles, which included Article 124 of the Criminal Code, had
been implicitly abrogated by the provisions of the ICESCR joined by
Egypt. The court affirmed that according to Article 151 of the
Constitution, international agreements adopted by the established
constitutional process and published in the Official Gazette are internal
laws that should be applied by the judiciary.
It was only natural that the juridical rule established by this historic
verdict agitate the authorities. The President used his prerogatives under
the Emergency Law to object to the ruling and ordered retrial.
The rule established by the Higher Court on the one hand, and the
reaction of the authorities to the verdict that was founded on the
obligatory force of international agreements on the other, indicate a
tendency on the part of the state to slight the commitments under the
international agreements it has joined. Another feature of this tendency is
the reservations made by Egypt on the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women upon joining it in 1981.
These reservations turn the ratification of the Convention into a dead
letter, as they go against the very purpose of the Convention.
The first reservation concerns Article 2, wherein States Parties undertake
to embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation; to adopt legislative
and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women; to establish legal protection of the rights
of women on an equal basis with men; and to take al appropriate
measures to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practice which constitute discrimination against women.
The Egyptian government also entered a reservation on Article 9,
paragraph 2, according to which the States Parties grant women equal
rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children. It is well
known that the Egyptian Nationality Law denies Egyptian women
married to foreigners the right to pass their nationality to their children,
whereas nationality is given to the children of Egyptian men married to
foreigners.15
Reservations also cover Article 16 which obligates States Parties to take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, and to ensure equal
rights to enter into marriage and at its dissolution.
As regards Egypt’s commitment to submit periodic reports to the
committees established according to international agreements, and
concerning the government’s adherence to the guidelines for the
preparation of such reports, we may notice first of all the government’s
failure to submit reports in due time. For example, the second periodic
report to the Human Rights Committee was submitted in July 1993, four
years after its due time. The report aroused severe criticisms by the
experts on the Committee, who noted the absence of any reference to
legal provisions to bring the Egyptian legislation into conformity with the
provisions of the ICCPR, ten years after ratification. They also noticed
that the Egyptian government, in declaring and renewing the state of
emergency, had neglected its commitment to officially notify other States
Parties to the ICCPR. The representatives of the government tried to
explain this away as “inadvertent.”
The Committee’s discussion of the report revealed a great flaw in Egypt’s
commitment to the provisions of the ICCPR. The Committee affirmed
that the uninterrupted state of emergency was a major obstacle to the full
implementation of the ICCPR provisions, specially in consideration of the
prevalence of administrative detention for extended duration in which the
detainees are subject to torture and maltreatment at the hands of the
police.
Also noted by the Committee was the role of military courts in trying
cases which do not refer to offences committed by members of the armed
forces in the course of their duties. In this regard, the Committee asked
the government to provide additional information on such vital issues as:
the imposition of the death penalty, the investigation of torture claims,
and the trial of perpetrators of torture, maltreatment and misuse of
firearms. The Committee further called on the Egyptian government to
give special attention to the protection of the rights of persons under any
form of detention or imprisonment.
The right of the President of the Republic to ratify judgments, which
includes his right to order retrial, was noted with concern by the
Committee. On the other hand, the government representatives argued
that this did not in any way constitute interference with the judicial16
process. They even went so far as to claim that retrials were a guarantee
to the benefit of defendants!! This is despite the fact that most of the
instances where the executive intervened for a retrial were cases in which
the defendants were acquitted by the court, as in the aforementioned case
of the striking train drivers.
There is also the example of the “Tamma case.” In October 1995, the
Higher State Security Court – Emergency acquitted five of the defendants
in the case known as the “Tamma terrorist organization case.” The court
opinion stated that the confessions attributed to the defendants were
extorted, as forensic reports affirmed that the defendants had been
tortured after their arrest, and thus were inadmissible as evidence. The
Military Governor used his powers under the Emergency Law to cancel
the ruling and order retrial before another judicial circuit of the same
court. In December 1997, the second court sentenced two to death, two to
life in prison with hard labor, and the action against the first defendant
abated because of his death during trial.
Moving to the periodic and supplementary reports by the government to
the Committee against Torture, we may notice, through the Committee’s
comments, that the government has ignored the Committee’s constant
demand that the established definition of torture set forth in Article 126 of
the Egyptian Criminal Law be revised as it is much narrower that that
adopted by the Convention against Torture. Article 126 defines as torture
only those cases where it is perpetrated with the purpose of obtaining
confession. Other wise, i.e. if a public official commits an act of torture
for purposes other than obtaining a confession, the perpetrator is free
from the punishment provided by this article (from 3 to 10 years of
imprisonment with or without hard labor).
The Committee against Torture had first made this demand to the
Egyptian government upon reviewing its first report in 1989, and
renewed the demand at the discussion of its first supplementary report in
late November 1993. Yet, this article remains to date a principal gateway
for perpetrators of torture to escape deterrent punishment. Common
practices of torture fall under the category “an act of cruel treatment,”
which is punished lightly by Article 129 of the Penal Code – no more
than one year of imprisonment or a fine of no more than two hundred
Egyptian pounds. And that is in case the Prosecution Office sees fit to
prosecute the perpetrators of these acts, for the Egyptian legislation
prevents the claimed victims of torture from directly filing action against
the alleged torturers on the grounds that they are public officials.17
The government has also ignored the CAT recommendations of 1993 and
1996 that stressed the necessity of a legislative reform to review the
extensive jurisdiction of the executive concerning the duration and
condition of detention and administrative arrest. The CAT also
recommended that the Egyptian government take serious and expeditious
measures to investigate the charges of torture made against the security
forcees and bring the perpetrators to justice if the charges were attested.
The CAT further stressed that the persistence of the state of emergency
constituted a major obstacle to the full implementation of the Convention
against Torture, and that combating terrorism should not be translated
into measures that contradict the provisions of the Convention. The
Committee added that exceptional circumstances could not be invoked to
justify the practice of torture that is asserted by NGO reports and by
information available to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.
After reviewing Egypt’s third periodic report in May 1999, the CAT
welcomed the mentioned release of a big number of persons detained
according to the Emergency Law, the establishment of a human rights
office at the Prosecutor General ’s office to investigate claims of torture,
and the compensations given to hundreds of victims of torture. However,
the CAT reiterated its deep concern at the great number of torture claims,
at the increasing death incidences in police stations and state security
offices, and at what is mentioned by the reports of the S.O.S concerning
the treatment of women in detention places which sometimes reaches
rape, or threats of it, with the purpose of obtaining information regarding
their wanted husbands or relatives.18
IV- The Egyptian Legislation and the International and
Constitutional Guarantees of Human Rights
It was noted earlier that the Emergency Law nullifies many constitutional
guarantees and rights. Its persistence was considered by the UN human
rights committees as an obstacle to the enforcement of international
human rights instruments. However, it is the whole legal structure that
denotes a great gap between human rights and their constitutional and
international guarantees on the one hand and the legal framework tailored
to organize the denial of these rights on the other.
Violation of the Right to Equality:
The Nationality Law denies Egyptian women who are married to
foreigners the right to pass their nationality to their children, while it
gives that right to Egyptian men who are married to foreigners. It should
be noted that this has no basis in any religious tenets. However, this is not
the only manifestation of the violation of the principle of equality before
the law. We may also cite the provisions of the Penal Code that are more
stringent in punishing women than men in crimes of honor and marital
infidelity, also without grounds in religion. According to the Penal Code,
judges are under the obligation to consider the commutation of penalty
for a man who finds his wife in the very act of marital infidelity and kills
her. The same obligation does not apply if a woman finds her husband in
the very act and kills him.
One of the citizenship rights, the right to liberty of movement, for a
woman is conditional upon the consent of her husband or guardian (who
has to be a man).
Another prominent expression of the violation of equality before the law
is the restrictions imposed by the “Khatt Hamayony” (Sultani Decree) on
building and renovating churches. The 150-year-old Ottoman Sultani
Decree provides that a Sultani order is required for building, repairing or
renovating any church. Later, such an order was replaced by a
presidential decree as requirement. This restriction is not made easier by
the Presidential Decree no. 13 of 1998, which authorizes governors to
undertake the prerogatives of the president in their respective
governorates as concerns issuing permissions for repairing churches.
Building or repairing mosques does not require such procedures.19
Denying the Freedom of Opinion:
As regards the freedom of opinion and expression, the Penal Code is full
of legal restrictions couched in equivocal wording that allow for
criminalizing and punishing the expression of opinions under various
pretexts. These include: threatening national unity and social peace;
contempt of the government or the ruling regime; advocacy or
commendation of some crimes; instigating non-compliance to the law;
advocacy of the domination of one social class over others; dissemination
of seditious or prejudiced propaganda; promotion of doctrines that aim at
changing the fundamentals of the constitution or the principal institutions
of society; discrediting the President of the Republic or presidents of
foreign states or their accredited representatives; and insulting the
legislative or judicial institutions, or the army, or public authorities and
institutions.
In this context, we should note the right of the Council of Ministers to
ban the circulation of any publications issued outside Egypt, according to
the Publications Law of 1936. Also, the quasi-governmental Committee
on Political Parties’ Affairs has the right to stop any political party’s
paper/s. That is in addition to the restrictions that absolutely prohibit
individuals from publishing newspapers, and those restrictions imposed
on the right of private juridical persons to publish newspapers which
became even stricter in the nineties. This point will be further discussed
in the section on the “legislative attack on civil society.”
Denying the Right to Freedom of Association:
1) There are numerous provisions in the Penal Code restricting the right
to form associations and organizations. Moreover, the equivocal
phrasing of such provisions gives room to penalizing public voluntary
activity. For example, the Penal Code criminalizes forming, founding,
organizing or directing associations or organizations that aim at the
domination of one social class over others. The law provides for the
imprisonment of anyone who forms, organizes or directs an
association that has as its purpose the advocacy, by any means, of
opposing the fundamental principles of the regime, or instigating the
hatred or derision thereof. It also provides for the imprisonment of
anyone to form, organize, or direct, without license by the20
government, any association of international character or branches
thereof.
2) These penalties complemented the provisions of the Law on Non-
Governmental Associations no. 32 of 1964, which remained in force
till May 1999, in undermining the right to form associations as
provided by the constitution and in imposing state hegemony on
public voluntary activity. Unfortunately, the Law on Non-
Governmental Associations no. 153 of 1999 went even further in
imposing the complete domination of the state over such activities.
This will be further discussed in the section on “the legislative attack
on civil society.”
3) On another level, the Law on Trade Unions no. 35 of 1967 includes
dozens of provisions that undermine the constitutional principle that
trade unions shall be based on a democratic foundation. The law
organizes trade unions in a pyramidal structure where all authority lies
at the top. It turned the authority of the grass-root organizations to the
general trade unions and the General Federation of Trade Unions, thus
transforming the grass-root organizations into mere subsidiary bodies
lacking any competence or ability to organize.
Law 35 of 1967 gave a wide array of prerogative to the executive, in the
person of the Minister of Manpower, through which the course of trade
union elections could be controlled. The Minister of Manpower is entitled
to set the rules forming the different levels of the trade union, and to fix
the dates and procedures of elections. The law and its amendments give
wide opportunity for the disqualification of undesired candidates through
the powers given to the Directorates of Manpower (which receive
nomination applications and also objections to them), and through the
general unions (from which candidates should obtain certification of the
validity of their membership and proofs that they have paid their
membership fees). The law also gave the administration the right to
object against the formation of trade union organizations, and the right to
determine the representation of trade union committees in the general
assemblies of the general unions, and the representation of the latter in
the General Federation of Trade Unions. Furthermore, Law 35 gives the
Minister of Manpower and the administration the right to suspend the
membership of board members of trade unions, and the right to demand
the dissolution of trade union boards before the Court of First Instance.
*
                                                          
* During the last two years, the Administrative Causes Court referred to the Higher
Constitutional Court eight challenges to the constitutionality of the Law on Trade21
Violation of the Right of Peaceful Assembly:
As regards the constitutional right of peaceful assembly, the authorities
have maintained the legal restrictions that were imposed by the British
occupation in Egypt. Foremost among these is the Law on Crowding no.
10 of 1914, which prohibits the assembly of five persons or more if the
authorities consider that it may jeopardize public peace.
There is also the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations no. 14 of 1923,
which includes a number of restrictions such as: the necessity of prior
notification of the security forcees; the right of the governor or the police
to ban the meeting in advance; the right of the police to attend the
meeting and determine its place; in addition to the right of the police to
disperse the meeting. In addition to these restrictions there is the
Emergency Law which gives the executive the right to impose restrictions
on the right of assembly.
Violation of the Right of Participation:
The problems surrounding the right of participation in the conduct of
public affairs do not stop at the previously mentioned constitutional
provisions (such as the restrictions on the nomination for presidency, or
the situation of the majority in parliament as at once adversary and arbiter
concerning the soundness of the membership of the members of the
parliament). In fact, the law gave the executive the full opportunity to
steer the course of general elections and to affect their fairness and
impartiality. The law charges the Ministry of Interior with full
supervision of all the stages of election, from drafting and preparing the
voters lists, to specifying the number and location of election committees
and subcommittees, to announcing the results.
Although Article 88 of the constitution stipulates that voting shall be
under the supervision of the judiciary, the Law on Regulating the Practice
of Political Rights, even after its amendment in 1990, allows for the
exclusion of the judiciary from supervising voting (which is the most
critical of the election stages). This law stipulates that heads of
subcommittees, where polling takes place, be appointed from among state
                                                                                                                                                                     
Unions and its amendments tackling most of its provisions. The challenges are still
under review by the Higher Constitutional Court.22
and public sector employees, and that they be chosen as much as possible
from among members of the judiciary or from the legal departments in
state institutions and the public sector.
Although in amending the law in 1990 the legislature raised the
maximum penalty for election violations, both in the sum of the fine and
the duration of imprisonment, they stopped short of considering such
serious violations as felonies. They are still considered mere
misdemeanors punishable with a maximum of three years in prison. Even
worse, Article 50 of the Law on Regulating the Practice of Political
Rights paves the way for perpetrators of such violations to escape
punishment. It provides that popular and civil actions abate with the lapse
of six months from the date of announcing the election results or the date
of the last procedure taken in the investigation of the case. This article
constitutes an outright violation of Article 57 of the constitution, which
states clearly that any infringement on the personal liberty, the sanctity of
the private life of citizens, or other public rights and freedoms
safeguarded by the constitution is a crime in relation to which criminal or
civil actions are not subject to statutory limitations.
For reasons of space we are not able to deal in details with the great gap
between the human rights guarantees provided by the constitution or
international instruments and their translation in the Egyptian legislation.
The previous review showed only indications of the glaring contradiction
between human rights guarantees and the legal structure that stands
against them. It is clear that the Egyptian state did not bring its laws into
conformity with the provisions of the human rights conventions it had
ratified. It did not undertake a comprehensive revision of all the laws
enacted before accession to such conventions. On the contrary, it went
along the opposite road in the laws adopted after ratifying them.
However, it is still necessary to pause at the most important laws issued
in the nineties that express an eager desire on the part of the state to
suppress civil society and its institutions.
The Legislative Attack on Civil Society:
The nineties in particular witnessed an increasing tendency to use
legislation in restricting the different agencies of society and in greatly
narrowing the relative democratic margin. This is manifested by a
number of laws issued during this decade, among the most important of
which are:23
1) The government did not content itself with the severe restrictions on
the freedom to form or join political parties provided by the Law on
Political Parties no. 40 of 1977, nor with the de facto ban on the
activities of the party and shutting them in their offices (through the
legal restrictions on the freedoms of association and peaceful
assembly). Thus it undertook to impose more restraints on those
seeking to establish new parties and on the existing ones. The 1992
amendments to Law no. 40/1977 stipulated a complete ban on
activities by parties “under establishment,” and provided a penalty of
five years in prison for violators. The intention of this provision was to
tighten the grip around the political forces that are denied legal
license, so that they could not practice any activity as a party “under
establishment” as the Nasserist party had done for five years before it
won its case in court.
The amendments also intensified the penalty on licensed parties if they
breach the rules on contacting foreign political parties. According to the
1992 amendments, they have to inform the Committee on Political
Parties’ Affairs of any intended contacts with foreign organizations, and
to submit a memorandum on the results of such contacts to the president
of the said committee. In addition, the Egyptian parties were banned from
making any contact with organizations that are not legally recognized n
their countries.
2) Under the banner “Guarantees of the Democracy of Professional
Syndicates” Law no. 100 of 1993 was issued with the purpose of
strangling the syndicates and completely incapacitating them. Law
100 introduced impracticable conditions to prevent reaching the
quorum legally required for the election of the boards of the
professional syndicates. In this way it opens the door for the
intervention of the authorities to appoint members of the board. It also
involves the judiciary in the management of the syndicates, which
contradicts the principle of the separation of powers and violates the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Besides, this law has
robbed the syndicates and their general assemblies of their established
right to lay down their bylaws and board election regulations.
The practical application of this law and its amendment led to the
implication of the judiciary in politically oriented conflicts between the
state and the professional syndicates. It also opened the door for conflicts
and legal disputes among syndicate members, which ended in the
imposition of judicial sequestration on two of the major syndicates (the
Bar Association and the Syndicate of Engineers), and prevented elections24
in at least eleven syndicates although the terms of their current boards
ended ten years ago.
3) In May 1994, the People’s Assembly made amendments to Law no. 49
of 1979 on the Regulation of Universities. According to the new
amendments college deans were to be appointed by university
presidents instead of their election. Also, the representation of college
deans and deputies of university presidents in the Higher Council of
Universities was cancelled, limiting the membership of the Council to
only university presidents. Despite the wide protests by university
staff that these amendments provoked, as being an infringement on the
independence of the university and a denial of the right of university
staff to manage their affairs in violation of the most rudimentary rules
of democracy, the People’s Assembly adopted them after a discussion
that did not take one full day.
4) In the context of the same orientation, the People’s Assembly
concurrently adopted a law stipulating the appointment of village
mayors and chiefs instead of their election.
5) In 1995 a new press law was passed (Law no. 93). It was a clear sign
by the state to its desire to end its relative tolerance of the existing
margin of the freedom of the press and the criticism directed at high
officials. This law, unprecedentedly, abrogated the guarantees enjoyed
by journalists against precautionary detention in publication offences.
It disregarded journalists’ goodwill in the case of reporting news or
information that they believe to be true. In addition, the law provides
punishments of imprisonment and fine for acts that were equivocally
described, including: publishing false or prejudiced news, data or
rumors, or seditionary propaganda, if it implies disturbing public
peace, harming the public good, deriding states institutions or their
officials, or spreading panic among the people. The law raised the
imprisonment penalty to five years if publication aimed at harming the
national economy or a national interest. It also raised the penalty
provided by the Penal Code on libeling a public official or a
representative of the people to a minimum of two years in prison, and
also raised the fine in such case one hundred times.
The law was passed without any prior consultation or dialogue with the
journalists or discussion in the papers. It was referred without warning to
the parliament by the government, and was passed in an evening session
attended by 44 out of a total of 454 members. The law was adopted with25
the approval of 33 members, i.e. around 7% of the members of the
parliament.
The wide resistance to the law by the journalists, the Press Syndicate and
human rights organizations led to the government backing down partially
on a number of its provisions only a year after its adoption. During that
year the law was applied against at least 99 journalists and writers who
were interrogated or tried before courts, among them 25 editors in chief
or board chairpersons of newspapers. Seven court rulings were issued
against journalists in that year, varying from two years with hard labor
and fines of 30-50 thousand pounds.
The journalists were able to score a partial victory one year after the
adoption of Law no.93/1995, dubbed by the media “assassination of the
press law,” and the in 1996 the People’s Assembly passed new laws
(95/1996 and 96/1996). The former revised the penalties against
journalists and the procedural safeguards they enjoy in press offences,
and the former set broad guidelines for the regulation of the press.
However, such victory was not enough to end all restrictions to the
freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in general, especially
in the absence of the relative tolerance of these freedoms that
characterized the eighties.
*
Although the precautionary detention of journalists for press offences was
prohibited, it remained in the case of “insulting” the President, although
this term is equivocal and could encompass severe criticism and faulting.
Also, detentive penalties in press offences were reduced while the
extravagant fines were kept which if applied liberally could lead to the
bankruptcy of some press firms. Moreover, the reduction of detentive
penalties is not consistent with the legal jurisprudence that calls for
canceling these penalties altogether as they imply deterring, terrifying and
retaliation, and hence their persistence becomes in effect prohibitive to
the practice of the freedom of the press
**. This is especially true given the
previously noted vagueness in defining the crimes of the press, opinion
and expression which could be easily interpreted to pursue and punish
both those who work in the field of expression and political opponents
                                                          
* This is not to deny of course the occasional infringements on the freedom of the
press in the eighties, which included the detention of some journalists according to the
Emergency Law and subjecting some of them to torture, occasional confiscation of
some newspapers, and assaulting journalists on professional missions.
** It should be noted here that the Higher Constitutional Court is currently considering
a number of challenges to the constitutionality of detentive penalties for journalists in
cases of press offences.26
On another level, the Law on the Regulation of the Press no. 96 of 1996
reinforced the restrictions on the freedom of publishing newspapers as it
maintained the existing ban on the right of individuals to publish or own
newspapers. For juridical persons seeking to publish newspapers, the law
made approval of the Higher Press Council obligatory and put excessive
financial conditions regarding the stock capital of the company: one
million Egyptian pounds for dailies; 250 thousand for weeklies; and 100
thousand for monthlies.
6) In January 1998 the People’s Assembly passed Law no.3 amending
some provisions of the Law on Joint Stock, Commandite, and Limited
Liability Companies. Although this law was promulgated to encourage
investment in Egypt through limiting the legal, administrative and
bureaucratic obstacles that face private companies, it reflected on another
hand the position of the government on the freedom of the press and
information and on the independence of private activities in general from
the domination of the state. Hence, as an exception to the facilities
provided by the law, it imposes a number of restrictions on companies
that have among its purposes working in the field of satellites, publishing
papers, remote detection systems, or any of the purposes included in the
Law on Non-Governmental Organizations and Private Associations. At
the top of these restrictions comes the approval by the Prime Minister.
7) On May 27
th, 1999 Law no. 153 on Non-Governmental Organizations
and Private Associations was issued to replace Law 32/1964. The new
law reinforced all the forms of governmental domination over public
voluntary activity, and closed the outlets that had allowed some NGOs
(especially advocacy groups in the fields of human rights and
women’s rights) to work independently from the intervention and
tutelage of the administration.
In the last few years a number of NGOs registered as non-profit civil
companies under civil law in order to avoid the provisions of Law
32/1964. This law gave the administration wide discretion concerning the
registration and licensing of NGOs. The administration could refuse the
registration of an NGO for security reasons or on the grounds that society
did not need its services or that there was another NGO/s that fulfill the
needs of society in that particular regard. The law also gave the
administration the power to dissolve the boards of NGOs and appoint
others, besides the right to close down their offices or dissolve the
organization altogether.27
The new law was issued amidst wide criticism on the part of human
rights organizations, civil activists, political parties and a host of public
figures. Even among its draft committee four members disclaimed the
law; one of them considered the day it was passed a “black day” for
public voluntary activity in Egypt. The Ministry of Social Affairs,
charged with drafting the law, had referred the best draft to the Council of
State to review before sending it to the parliament, and then disregarded
the fundamental amendments the Council demanded so as to avoid
challenges of unconstitutionality. These amendments were to give more
freedom to public voluntary work and loosen the grip of the
administration on it. Nevertheless, the government used the name of the
Council of State to justify such amendments made to the law that
multiplied its demerits in the final version.
Here follows are the principal objections to the law:
1st)  The law extended the causes for banning NGOs or denying them
legal license, going beyond Article 55 of the constitution which
prohibits only those NGOs whose activities are hostile to society,
clandestine or of military nature. The law adds to this NGOs whose
purposes include practicing political or syndicate activities that are
restricted to political parties and syndicates or trade unions. The
Executive Regulations of the law explicitly prohibit any activities by
NGOs in defense of employees against employers
.
b) The law upholds the authority of the administration in granting legal
license, instead of adopting the democratic alternative, namely that NGOs
be established upon notification. The drafters of the law have neglected
the legal opinion of the Council of State in this regard.
c) The law violates citizens’ right to have recourse to their competent
judge, as it withdraws the competence of the administrative causes courts
to consider challenges to the decisions of the administration and gives it
to courts of first instance, though the constitution recognizes the former
as the court with general jurisdiction over all administrative disputes
*.
d)The law introduced an ad hoc committee to consider any such disputes
that may arise between NGOs and the administration. The composition of
the committee is not balanced, as it tilts towards the side of the
administration.
                                                          
* It should be noted here that three months after the adoption of this law the
Administrative Causes Court of Tanta referred to the Higher Constitutional Court a
challenge to the constitutionality of the jurisdiction of courts of first instance over
disputes between NGOs and the administration.28
 This committee is more of a compulsory arbitration committee, as the
law allows the referral of the dispute to court only after it issues a
decision on the matter or after sixty days of bringing the case to its
attention. This leads to the violation of citizens’ right to have recourse to
their competent judge.
e)The law gives the administration vast powers at the expense of the
competence of the general assembly of the NGO. For example, it gives
the administration the right to veto the statutes or the founders of the
organization, and puts the organization under the supervision of the
administration in amending its statutes. The law also gives the
administration the right to veto any decision taken by the organization’s
general assembly and to demand its withdrawal, in addition to the right to
convene the general assembly. Besides, the administration has the right to
strike out the name of whomsoever it wishes from the list of candidates to
the board of an NGO after the list is submitted to it. Moreover, the law
arbitrarily imposes a certain system for electing NGO boards and the
number of their members.
f) The law contradicts the constitutional guarantees that provide for the
establishment of unions on democratic basis. It authorizes the President
of the Republic to appoint the chair and one third of the members of the
General Union of NGOs, and rules out pluralism -- whether on the level
of regional and specialized unions or the general union.
g) The law gives the administration a wide scope to control the activities
of NGOs by allowing it the right to veto the NGO joining or affiliating
with any club, society or association outside Egypt. The law also makes
acquiring financial assistance from abroad to fund the programs and
activities of NGOs dependent upon the approval of the Minister of Social
Affairs.
Given these and other shortcomings, the report of the joint mission of the
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network and the International
Federation of Human Rights described this law as a step back for the
promotion and protection of human rights. The report maintained that it
unnecessarily restricts the right of freedom to associations as guaranteed
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
expressed the belief that the law will block the work of human rights
NGOs. The report concludes that it is difficult to see that the new law is
better than the previous Law 32/1964, as it is built on mistrust about civil
society organizations and seems to a large extent to have been drafted in
the spirit of the old.29
lV- The Salient Features of Human Rights Violations
In the context of a legal environment that is hostile to human rights in
general, and under an uninterrupted state of emergency since 1981, Egypt
witnesses massive violations to the whole body of human rights. These
violations were exacerbated by the rise of the political Islamic trend, with
its agenda that opposes principal aspects of human rights, and the use of
violence and terrorism by some of its factions (whether in a vindictive
reaction against the violations committed by the state against a large
number of their members, or in an attempt to impose their visions by
force on the Egyptian citizens, and to realize their political objective,
namely the establishment of an Islamic state).
It could be said that the emergency law has become a means to give free
reign to the security forces against citizens in general. The arbitrary
application of the emergency law, and the often violation of its provisions
even, have resulted in the rise in the violation of a vast number of rights,
foremost of which are: the right to life; the right to liberty and security of
the person; the right to bodily integrity and protection from torture; and
the right to a fair and just trial.
First: Violent Suppression of Peaceful Assemblies:
The security forces have increased their arbitrary use of firearms, whether
in tracking down suspected members of violent or terrorist groups, or in
dispersing some peaceful assemblies that have no relation to terrorism. In
the first half of the nineties in particular, there were many allegations that
scores of Islamic groups members were target for physical liquidation and
extra-judicial killing. The EOHR has succeeded in documenting some of
these cases. These allegations are backed by the official discourse, as a
former minister of interior used to direct his officers repeatedly to follow
a “shoot to kill” policy – and in the very heart.
The expansion in the arbitrary use of firearms against members of Islamic
groups was also coupled by the excessive use of force to scatter some
peaceful assemblies, which resulted in many victims. Here are some of
the most notable examples. In August 1989, security forces barged into
the Iron & Steel factory in Helwan (a Cairo suburb) to force workers to
end their peaceful sit-in strike. This resulted in the death of one worker.
In October 1994, security forces cordonned the buildings of the Spinning
& Weaving Company in Kafr Al-Dawwar (in the Northern governorate of
Al-Beheira) to force workers to end their sit-in strike. They opened fire30
indiscriminately at crowds of citizens, which led to the death of four, and
the injury of dozens (among them nine were hit by pellets in their eyes).
Furthermore, in April 1998, the security forces have used firearms to
disengage a demonstration protesting against the death of someone
because of torture in a police station in Bilqas, in the northern
governorate of Daqahleya. This resulted in the death of another citizen
who has been shot in the course of the demonstration.
Due to the heavy-handedness of the police in implementing house-
clearance orders in the village of Al-Qurnah, Luxor (in Upper Egypt) in
February 1998, there was a confrontation with the dwellers. The police
opened fire intensively and indiscriminately, leaving four dead.
We may also note the severe violence of the police in dispersing the
peaceful march of the Egyptian lawyers on May 17
th, 1994, to protest
against the death of their colleague, attorney Abdel Hareth Madani, when
circumstances indicated his probable subjection to torture after arrest. The
security forces showered the lawyers gathered at the offices of the Bar
Association with tear gas bombs, rubber bullets and pellets. Eyewitnesses
attested that the security forces had intentionally shelled their bombs at
the levels of the attorneys’ bodies, and into the Bar Association’s rooms,
instead of shooting them up in the air. This led to a high number of
casualties among the lawyers, and many of them suffered asphyxia.
Earlier, in February 1991, the police violently attacked a peaceful student
march inside the student hostel of Cairo University in protest against the
Gulf War. One student died from severe wounds.
In addition, four citizens were killed in 1997 by the security forces when
they used firearms to disperse some demonstrations against the
implementation of the new law on agricultural land tenure.
Second: Torture: A Crime without Punishment:
The spread of torture on a wide scale, the maltreatment of detainees and
prisoners, the poor conditions in prisons, and the lack of the minimum
standards of health care inside of them, have led to the rise in deaths
inside police stations, state security police offices and prisons. Basing on
the EOHR reports, we can say that no less than 120 persons have died
inside prisons and other detention places from 1990 to 1999, as a result of
torture, maltreatment and the lack of the minimum health care standards.31
The latest Amnesty International report
2 indicates that torture is still
being practiced regularly on political detainees in state security police
offices, in police stations and sometimes in prisons. The report mentions
that the most common methods of torture are: electrocution, beating,
hanging in various positions, burning by cigarettes, in addition to various
means of psychological torture, such as the threat to kill, rape or sexually
abuse the detainee, or threatening to rape or sexually abuse his female
relatives
3.
The EOHR had earlier presented a detailed report to the Committee
against Torture (CAT), during its discussion of the Egyptian Government
report of 1993, which included 221 cases of torture. The EOHR
documented these cases on the basis of judicial rulings; examinations by
the court of the victims’ bodies, reports by the Forensic Medicine
Authority of the Ministry of Justice, the minutes of investigation by the
prosecution office, in addition to examination by EOHR staff. We should
note here that three EOHR board members and a number of its members
were subjected to torture in 1989 and 1991. In its 16
th  session in 1996,
the Committee against Torture concluded that torture is being practiced
routinely by security forces in Egypt, especially by the state security
police.
The Egyptian government denies its practice of torture, claiming that in
most cases it is a mere allegation on the part of suspects or convicts in
terrorist crimes who try to avoid indictment. However, torture and all
other kinds of maltreatment have, since the mid-eighties to date, been
applied against all political currents – Nasserists, communists, Muslim
Brothers, Shiites, in addition to members of violent and terrorist groups.
The practice of torture and maltreatment included Copts as well.
According to EOHR reports, many people were tortured because of their
claimed conversion from Islam to Christianity, or because they allegedly
undertook Christian missionary work. Torture was practiced on a wide
scale against the people of the predominantly Christian village Koshah in
August 1998 to obtain information in an ordinary case of murder.
Torture in police stations against suspects of non-political crimes
punishable under public law has increased. It is committed with the
purpose of obtaining confessions; in some cases officers committed
torture as a kind of “favor” to their relatives, friends or some influential
person. Torture in police stations has taken some abominable forms. The
                                                          
2   The 1998 Amnesty International report on human rights violations in the world.
  
3 See: Torture in Egypt: An unpunished Crime (The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights; Cairo;
     1993).32
EOHR records cases in which the victim was injected with polluted
substances. Al-Nadim Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of
Violence records the case of an officer spilling kerosene on the body of a
victim, setting him on fire and leaving him till he died in the police
station.
It is evident that the exacerbation in the practice of violence in Egypt has
been closely linked to a number of factors, on top of which are the
following:
  1-  Undermining the legal guarantees provided to those arrested or
detained, whether by virtue of the Emergency Law or the legal
amendments on combating terrorism.
 
  2-  Consigning the detainees to illegal places of custody, such as state
security police offices, or the training camps of the central security
paramilitary forces. This is besides the continued closing of prisons
and preventing prisoners from contacting their relatives or lawyers, in
violation of law and many judicial rulings.
3- The slight penalties against torture, especially in the light of the flawed
definition of torture in the Egyptian Penal Code. The law defines torture
as such only when its purpose is to obtain a confession, and thus most of
the crimes of torture come under the category of “maltreatment,”
punishable only by a maximum of one year in prison (even if torture had
led to the death of the victim).  This legislative defect also explains the
recurrent denial by the Egyptian government before the UN human rights
committees of the practice of torture and its continuous assertion that they
are exceptional individual incidents
4.
4- Depriving citizens of their right to file criminal lawsuits against those
who tortured them. Filing a criminal action and proceeding with the
case against public officials is the exclusive right of the prosecution
office. The prosecution may at any point order nolle prosequi, leave
the case on file, or consider there is no cause of criminal action.
                                                          
4 A  former Prosecutor General  (in charge of initiating legal proceedings against
suspects of committing torture) states that “the cases classified as torture, as a felony,
are limited individual cases, and are not as common as some imagine. The other cases
are classified as an act of cruelty, and are regarded by law as misdemeanors.” He adds
that the “acts of torture that have been referred to the criminal court were assaults
with a sharp tool. In many cases, the assault was not grave, yet the assaulted could not
bear it. There is no flagrant torture. Some blows might be light but the victim could




Thousands have been arbitrarily detained without charges and without
being brought to trial under the powers given to the Ministry of Interior
by the Emergency Law, which allows the arrest of people on suspicion.
The escalation of acts of violence and terrorism has added further pretexts
to broaden the scope of arrests to include large numbers of citizens who
are in no way connected to the acts of violence. It has become a common
practice on the part of the state to hold as hostages the wives, parents or
siblings of wanted persons, whether in crimes of violence or any other
crimes. Thousands of people were subject to recurrent and prolonged
detention in circumvention of final court rulings to release them for the
insufficiency of causes of arrest. Security forces release those who
receive release orders but only on paper; in reality they are removed to
other detention places, confined there for some time, and then brought
back under new detention orders. In 1995, the EOHR was able to
document the numbers of those repeatedly detained, which reached
approximately 7000 at the time. Many of them were in detention for more
than five years without charges or trial, although they had received final
court verdicts ordering their release.
Despite the release of several thousands of persons under administrative
detention in 1998 (which is a positive indicator), of others are still
detained according to Amnesty International estimates. Among the
detainees are scores of lawyers who have been detained several years ago.
Some of them had been considered arbitrarily detained in November 1995
by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the UN Human Rights
Center, which asked the Egyptian government to give clarifications to
deny these information or present an acceptable explanation to the
continuation of their arrest.
In relation to the prevalence of torture and the great number of resultant
deaths, the prevalence of arbitrary arrest, the intentional concealing of
information about the places of detention, the closing of prisons and the
isolation of prisoners from the outside world, there rose the phenomenon
of the enforced disappearance of a number of arrested persons. Based on
the complaints it receives the EOHR estimates the number of persons
subject to enforced disappearance from 1992 to the end of 1998 at thirty-
one. Efforts to determine their whereabouts by the EOHR and their
relatives have been in vain.
Fourth: Circumscribing Participation:
In nearly twenty-three years of restricted political pluralism, the political
life in Egypt has witnessed the establishment of fourteen parties.34
Nevertheless, the freedom of establishing parties has been often targeted
and curbed either by law or in practice. Those deprived of this right,
particularly the communists and the Muslim Brothers, have been pursued,
maltreated or unfairly tried before State Security, Emergency or Military
Courts.
The legal foundations of pluralism were bound by the philosophy of the
totalitarian system that sought to preserve the heritage and traditions of
the one-party system in place since 1952. Thus, the aforementioned
provisions of the Law on Political Parties do not allow the freedom to
form political parties to any independent intellectual trends. A new party
has to commit itself to: the principles of both the 23
rd of July and the 15
th
of May revolutions; the tenets of the Shari’a; and what the law describes
as the requirements of preserving national unity, social peace,
fundamentals of the constitution, the socialist gains and the alliance of the
working peoples forces. Remarkably, besides the commitment to such
rigid political and intellectual frameworks, a new party has to present a
distinctly different program! On the basis of this condition alone the
majority of the new parties were rejected.
The problems of the existing parties are not confined to their historical
origin or to the severe restrictions on the permissible difference between
their orientations, programs and policies and those of the ruling regime.
In fact, the legal frameworks that curtail the freedoms of opinion,
expression, the press and peaceful assembly, and those that deny the right
to take part in the conduct of public affairs have in turn prevented the
parties from fulfilling their political functions  (political education,
interaction with the public and influencing the decision-making process).
All these restrictions shut the existing parties within their offices. Their
principal means of communication and of influencing public opinion has
become their newspapers. The effectiveness of the party press however
has been governed by the tolerance of the ruling regime and its desire to
either use or not use the penal system against political opponents. The
role of the parties was marginalized, their membership shrank, and their
isolation from the masses was increased because of the penal system on
the one hand and the extension of the Emergency Law applications and
torturing practices to include those active in political parties on the other.
This was further aggravated by the disillusionment about the opportunity35
of political change through general elections whose results bolster the
hegemony of the one party system.
*
The participation of the parties in the conduct of public affairs through
nomination and voting is rendered impossible under the restrictions
imposed on the freedom to form parties and under the legal structure that
stifles the activities of the parties and political activity in general. This is
especially true given the domination of the government and the ruling
party over elections to all representative bodies. In addition to the state’s
total monopoly of the radio and TV, and their employment all day long in
praising the government and its party, with the exception of few minutes
given to the opposition parties’ leaders on the eve of parliamentary
elections. The government has not responded at all to the opposition’s
repeated demand of guarantees to the fairness and neutrality of elections.
On top of these guarantees is the necessity of full judiciary supervision on
all the electoral process.
Under these circumstances, only a number of five opposition parties
succeeded in entering the parliament, and only marginally. The 1995
elections, in which all the opposition parties participated, was a crystal-
clear manifestation of the one-party-system philosophy as the opposition
parties altogether held only thirteen seats in the parliament, i.e. 2.9% of
the total number of seats.
If we move to those political forces that are denied the right to form their
own independent parties or organizations, foremost of which are the
communists and the Muslim Brother, we find that their activity is under
constant siege. Members of such organizations are subject to recurrent
pursuits, precautionary detention and trials before the state security,
emergency or military courts.
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Fifth: Limits of the Freedoms of Opinion, Thought and
Creativity
The Egyptian legislation is replete with normal and exceptional
provisions that criminalize the freedom of opinion and expression, and
impose restrictions on those working in these fields. Yet, the eighties –in
particular- gave an impression of tolerance on the part of the regime
towards dissidence, despite possessing the legal tools to punish at will
those who exercise such freedoms. This latter option became clear in the
nineties, which witnessed in its later half an increasing tendency to
marginalize these freedoms in the context of a legislative attack on civil
society and democratic freedoms.
It could be said that the pressures on these freedoms come from three
sources. First: the state, its legislative restrictions, regulations, police
practices, and its yielding to pressure from the other two sources. Second:
some Political Islamic groups that generate pressure to ban whatever
contradict with their concepts and visions. Third: the pressure by some
Arab governments on the Egyptian authorities to black out criticism of
their political stances or the conduct of their rulers.
To argue the relatively better condition of these freedoms in the eighties
is not to belittle the gravity of the violations that occurred in this period.
A report by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR)
*
mentions that in 1988-90 three journalists and writers were prevented
from travelling abroad, fifteen journalists were provocatively stopped at
Cairo airport on returning from abroad, the homes of two journalists were
broken into and their books and papers confiscated, thirteen journalists
were assaulted while on professional missions, thirty three were detained
in police stations and prisons for periods ranging from two days to seven
months, ten of them were subjected to beating and torture.
The nineties brought forth more pressures against the freedoms of
opinion, expression, thought and creativity – whether by the state or some
Political Islamic groups that used intellectual and physical terrorism
against their opponents from among the intellectuals and artists. In its
battle against the freedom of opinion and expression in the nineties, the
state showed increased intransigence and summoned the reservoir of
exceptional legislation to terrorize those who work in this field. This is
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evidenced by the referral of journalists and writers to military courts; the
imprisonment of journalists on an unprecedented scale; the increased
measures impounding and suspending newspapers; in addition to the
increasing number of confiscated publications.
In this regard, it should be noted that from 1990 to 1995
* the government
brought ten journalists before the Military Prosecutor General , and
referred four of them to military court for publishing views and
information on the charges of divulging military secrets and threatening
national security.
The government also invoked the legal amendments on combating
terrorism to pursue eleven journalists, and put a number of them under
precautionary detention, on such charges as insulting the President of the
Republic, contempt of the government, and threatening social peace.
During the same period, thirteen journalists were referred to court on
charges of libel or insulting public officials.
Impounding of publication increased in range to include sixty books and
three periodicals, among them two foreign. It is noteworthy that a large
number of these books dealt with social or political conditions in some
Arab countries, particularly the Gulf states, which denotes compliance to
the pressures exerted by the governments of these countries.
Moreover, the role of Al Azhar in impounding publications took on a new
shape. Instead of merely recommending confiscation, some committees at
Al Azhar Islamic Research Council impounded publications by
themselves. Al Azhar came to be considered the principal censorship
authority, especially after the legal opinion issued by the State Council in
1994. It maintained that it was Al Azhar alone that had the binding
opinion over the Ministry of Culture in deciding on the Islamic
considerations for granting or denying license to audio-visual materials.
The same period witnessed grave threats to the freedoms of opinion,
expression and thought. The secular intellectual Farag Fouda was
assassinated, and Naguib Mahfouz was almost killed in an attempt on his
life. The pressures of the intransigent Islamic trend came to bear within
the academia. For example, Assistant Professor Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid of
the faculty of art, Cairo University, was denied promotion as his
researches and views were considered in contradiction with the
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Shari’a.(Islamic law) Islamist lawyers used the “Hisba” concept to take
Dr. Abu Zaid to court demanding that he be divorced from his wife on the
grounds of his alleged apostasy
*. A number of intellectuals, writers and
artists were likewise brought to court according to “Hisba.” In addition,
twenty-six journalists, writers, poets, university teachers and cinema
managers and owners were brought to court using the Penal Code on such
charges as: jeopardizing national unity or social peace; the propagation of
ideas or opinions that imply sedition or disparaging religions; and the
dissemination of whatever conflict with public morals.
According to Law no. 93 of 1995, known as the assassination of the press
law, ninety-nine writers, journalists and editors in chief were either
interrogated or brought to trial. However, its amendment by Laws no. 95
and 96 of 1996 was not enough to put an end to the attack on the
freedoms of the press, opinion and expression. On the contrary, 1996-9
witnessed the escalation of the attack, by using the provisions of the
Penal Code against journalists.
The EOHR notes that no less than eighty journalists were interrogated or
tried in thirty-five libel cases in 1998.
** There was a noticeable expansion
in these cases in the use of detentive penalties in press and publication
violations. In 1998, six journalists were sentenced to imprisonment for 3-
6 months or a year. The sentences were carried out in full or in part. Also,
in 1999, a final verdict sentenced three journalists at Al Shaab newspaper
to one year in prison for libel against the Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Agriculture.
A brigadier in the police was brought to a disciplinary trial on the charge
of insulting the police force in his novel Diaries of an Officer in the
Countryside. The novel tackled the relation between the police, citizens
and public prosecution in Upper Egypt, and touched on the practice of
torture in police stations. Though judged innocent of charges, the
brigadier was suspended for one month. In May 1997, writer Ala’a
Hamed was again sentenced to prison. A final court ruling ordered his
imprisonment for one year on the basis of his novel The Bed, which
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contained, according to the charges, ridicule of the clergy and invitation
to moral degeneration.
Moreover, impounding newspapers increased in the last four years. For
example, issue no. 8 of Al Tadamun (Solidarity) newspaper, which is
licensed in Cyprus and printed and circulated in Egypt, was impounded.
In addition, the Minister of Information ordered a ban on its printing in
Egypt. The independent weekly Al Dostour (The Constitution) was
impounded and stopped from circulation more than once in 1996. In
February 1998, the Minister of Information issued an administrative
decree prohibiting its printing and circulation in Egypt. The paper
officials sought to acquire a license according to the Law on Stock
Companies, but the relevant administrative authority refused to grant
them the license on the basis of the objection of some security agency.
The English-language Middle East Times was impounded or stopped
from circulation eight times in ten months in 1996. In 1997, a court ruling
ordered the suspension of Al Shaab for three consecutive issues on the
grounds that the paper had contravened the Prosecutor General ’s ban on
publishing in relation to the charges brought against the paper by the
Minister of Interior. Al Shaab had launched a wide campaign against the
Minister of Interior charging him with abuse of power.
Cairo Times and The Middle East Times were once again impounded and
prevented form printing in 1998. The ban on printing extended to apply to
dozens of newspapers and specialized periodicals, as the Head of the
General Authority for Investment ordered a ban on the printing of papers
and journals of all kinds and languages inside the free zones. This
decision harmed more than thirty papers and journals that were licensed
abroad in order to evade the severe restrictions on the publication of
papers in Egypt. Also in relation to impounding, we should note the
confiscation of issues no. 1 and 2 of a newspaper called Arabian Nights,
which was denied access into Egypt although it is an artistic paper and is
licensed in Cyprus.
Also in this context, we may note that the amendments to the Law on Stock Companies, which require
the approval of the Prime Minister for the registration of companies with the purpose of publishing
newspaper, have led in effect to precluding the production of no less than twenty papers in 1998.40
VI- Effort towards the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights
First: The Role of the Egyptian Judiciary
The role of the judiciary in protecting and promoting human rights
depends on the following:
1) The legislature upholding public rights and freedoms and human
rights guarantees.
2) Safeguarding the right of all citizens to litigation and to have recourse
to their competent judge.
3) Guarantees to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and
its immunity from pressures or interferences from the executive
authority.
4) Respect of judicial rulings on the part of the executive authority.
A Glorious Role by the Higher Constitutional Court:
Despite the infringements on the independence of the judiciary, the
pressures of the executive, the exceptional courts, and the often denial of
citizens’ right to have recourse to their competent judge, the Egyptian
judiciary has on numerous occasions stood for public rights and freedoms
and checked the hostility of the legislation towards them.
As regards the role of the judiciary in challenging the laws that violate
human rights and contradict the principles of the constitution and the
constitutional guarantees of public rights and freedoms, a survey of the
rulings of the Higher Constitutional Court
* reveals that it has abrogated
no less than 120 provisions of different laws, decrees and regulations
since its inception in 1979 until October 1997. The court found these
provisions in violation of 53 articles of the constitution (out of a total of
211).
These rulings show that the abrogated provisions did not leave a single
human right without denying it or restricting it in such a way that
precluded its exercise. These provisions have for years violated public
rights and freedoms in addition to such principles as the equality before
the law, the equality of opportunity, the independence of the judiciary,
and the subjection of the state to law. This is in addition to such rights as
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property rights, equality between women and men, and the rights to work,
to education and to social security.
For example, 49 of these abrogated provisions had violated the principle
of equality before the law. Eighteen had violated the right to liberty and
security of the person. Seven had violated the freedom of opinion and
expression, and ten violated the right to vote and to be elected. Twenty-
one provisions had violated citizens’ rights to litigation and to have
recourse to their competent judge, in addition to violating fifteen
constitutional articles to the effect that punishment is personal, that there
shall be no punishment except by law, no punishment without a ruling by
a court of law and no punishment except for acts committed subsequent
to the date of coming into force of the law. In addition, sixteen provisions
had violated Article 67 of the constitution which states that the accused is
innocent until proven guilty by a court of law where he is guaranteed the
means to defend himself. The Higher Constitutional Court abrogated also
12 provisions that violated the rights to legal defense as provided by the
constitution. Moreover, five laws had violated Article 64 of the
constitution which stipulates that the rule of law is the basis of
government. The rulings of the court record that fourteen of the abrogated
provisions had violated the principle of the subjection of the state to law
and the principle that the independence of the judiciary is an essential
guarantee to the protection of public rights and freedoms.
Needless to say, the size of this study does not allow us to deal in detail
with the role of the Higher Constitutional Court in opposing dozens of
laws that contradicted human rights. Yet, it may suffice to note that
judgments of this court have led to the dissolution of two People’s
Assemblies, the Shura Council (the upper chamber of the parliament),
and the popular and municipal councils elected in 1992. The Court ruled
that the laws regulating the election to these councils were in violation of
the constitutional guarantees to the equality of opportunity between
citizens, equality before the law, the right to the freedom of opinion and
expression, and the right to vote and to be elected.
The Higher Constitutional Court was able also to defeat the severe
restrictions on the freedom to form and join political, parties and on the
practice of political rights in general, that had been provided by Article 4
of the Law on Protecting the Internal Front and Social Peace. This article
had barred those who participated “in corrupting political life before the
revolution of July 23
rd, 1952” from joining parties or practicing political
rights or activities. The Court has also abrogated Article 4 of the Law on42
Political Parties that had denied those who oppose the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty from their right to form political parties.
In addition, the Higher Constitutional Court abrogated a number of the
provisions of the Law on Vagrancy and Suspicion that had allowed
consigning the suspects of certain crimes to a work establishment to be
determined by the Minister of Interior for a period of no less than six
months and no more than three years. These provisions had also provided
for consigning the suspects to public prisons for thirty days.
In protection of the freedom of opinion and expression, the Court
abrogated the legal provisions that had provided for the criminal liability
of the president of a political party for publication offences by the party
press, and the criminal liability of the editor in chief of a newspaper for
publication offences by the paper.
Other landmarks:
In addition to the prominent role of the Higher Constitutional Court, other
Egyptian courts have taken outstanding positions in defense of human
rights, by condemning and documenting human rights violations,
uncovering arbitrary measures against citizens and ordering redress, as
well as requiring the authorities to take some measures (including
legislation) to prevent violations or to ensure that the perpetrators of
violations are pursued and deterred.
One of the most prominent court rulings to be based on the international
human rights law was that acquitting striking train drivers by the Higher
State Security Court -- Emergency in 1986. In its judgment the court
considered that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ratified by Egypt provides for the right to peaceful strike
and thus annuls the Penal Code provisions that punish it. However, this
significant precedent was not maintained and was effectively sidelined by
the powers of the President under the state of emergency: the President
did not ratify the ruling and ordered retrial before another judicial circuit.
Many court rulings have reversed the orders by the Ministry of Interior to
close four prisons, under the pretext of security considerations, denying
prisoners any contact with the outside world, their lawyers or families..”43
As regards the judiciary’s protection of the freedom of opinion and
thought and its opposition to confiscation of books (especially at the
recommendation of Al-Azhar Islamic Research Council), we should note
the ruling by Cairo Northern Court of First Instance in August 1997
ordering the release of Dr. Sayyed Qimni’s  “The God of Time.” The
verdict spelled out the court’s rejection of the logic of confiscation, and
affirmed the importance of dialogue and respect of different opinions as a
safeguard of the integrity of the nation. The verdict further declared that
the disagreement between the opinions of the author and that of the
Islamic Research Council can not be solved by one negating or
confiscating the other, as that contradicts with the freedom of opinion and
scientific research provided by the constitution. Thus, the verdict stated, it
can be solved only by sober scientific dialogue and by unbridling thought
and ideas so that the truth may become evident and minds be clear.
*
The Judiciary Stands against Omissions by the Prosecution Office:
In consistency with the constitution and the Convention against Torture,
the Egyptian judiciary has in many cases disregarded coerced confessions.
A number of rulings courageously exposed the practice of torture, and
sometimes the judges themselves had to undertake investigation into the
claims of torture when they felt that the Prosecution Office had neglected
it. Some rulings called upon the state to adopt a number of essential
measures to stop torture. Here are some examples:
-  The ruling by the Higher State Security Court of February 1990
acquitting fifteen defendants in what was known as the “Armed
Nasserist Organization” case. The court established that the
confessions of the defendants were the result of torture.
-  The ruling by the Higher State Security Court declaring twenty-seven
defendants innocent on the charge of assassinating the former speaker
of the parliament (Rifaat Al-Mahgoub) on the ground that none of
them was saved from torture.
In July 1991, the court had to assign a Justice of its members to
investigate the incidences of torture due to the prosecution office’s
negligence it noted. The ruling stated: “although the court has referred the
defendants to the competent prosecution offices to investigate these
incidences, until the day of fixing a date for announcing judgment, three
years later, no investigation results reached the court. The court did not
wish to wait longer so that judgment would not be further delayed.”
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-  The ruling by the Higher State Security Court of January 1987
acquitting thirteen defendants on the charge of selling spirits. The
court disregarded all the confessions attributed to them given the
torture they had been subjected to which included repeated beating
and inserting sticks and fingers in their behinds.
-  The ruling by the Higher State Security Court – Emergency acquitting
four defendants on the charge of setting fire to video rental clubs in
Imbaba. The court based its judgment on the fact that the defendants
had to give false confessions under torture.
-  The ruling by the Higher State Security Court – Emergency in the case
known in the media as the “people of Al-Kom Al-Ahmar village
case.” In addition to acquitting the defendants (twenty-six), the ruling
made explicit note of the forms of collective punishment against the
people of Al-Kom Al-Ahmar after an ordinary fight between a police
officer and one of the residents in 1988. The court stated that the
confessions of some defendants were a result of the physical and
moral coercion against the whole village not the defendants alone. The
ruling also mentioned that more than four hundred of the villagers
were subject to torture and maltreatment, and that women were taken
hostages until their male relatives turned themselves in
*.
-  In its ruling of February 1990 in the case no. 382/1986, the Higher
State Security Court tackled the impartiality of the prosecution office
in some cases involving the freedom of opinion and the danger of
entrusting the prosecution with the faculties of the Inquiry Judge,
especially in political crimes and crimes related to the expression of
opinion. The ruling stated:
The court notices that the charges usually directed at arrest
proceedings have extended to apply to the public
prosecution’s investigation proceedings, such as:
impartiality, omitting some sayings or incidences, threats,
favoring police officers and others. If this spreads it would
inevitably affect the whole process of justice. This can not
be ended or precluded except if the investigators themselves
provide the guarantees to safeguard their proceedings and
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acts from well-founded charges. The ultimate guarantee is
the members of the prosecution and judges themselves, not
a provision to be enacted or a regulation to be published. A
just judge outweighs any legal provision in the
establishment of justice. It grieves the court that challenges
are made to the public prosecution proceedings, and that
such challenges are based on reasons that documents prove.
Hence, the court calls for the amendment of legislation so
that only Inquiry Judges carry out investigation in case
involving the freedom of opinion, and that suspects in
political cases may request the appointment of an Inquiry
Judge. In the latter case, investigation should be invalid if
the request of the suspect is not answered or if the judge’s
assumption of investigation was hampered. Only such an
amendment could safeguard the rights of suspects in
political cases and those involving the freedom of opinion,
as some law-enforcement officers feel specially hostile
towards them and thus err and fall into the pit of committing
torture.
*
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Second: The Role of the Human Rights Movement in the Protection
and Promotion of Human Rights
The birth of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) in
1985 marked the actual beginning of the human right movement in Egypt.
Since then, the role of this movement has been steadily increasing for a
number of factors
5:
 1.  The increase in the general awareness of the value of democracy in
light of the absolute failure of the regimes which tried to propose social
justice and national liberation as excuses to forfeit democracy.
 2.  The deterioration of human rights conditions in Egypt, which was
manifested in:
 •  Declaring the state of emergency once again in 1981, which meant
placing security forces above the law, and giving an implicit protection
to the practices of torture, detention, and extrajudicial killing.
 •  The escalation of the political Islamist movement with its agenda
which opposes freedoms of thought, creativity, opinion and expression;
and the realization by intellectuals that the human rights movement
would provide a solid fighter in the defense of these rights and the
rejection of any blackmail under the name of religion.
 •  The unprecedented escalation of acts of violence committed by armed
Islamist groups, and the widening of its scope to go beyond targeting
officials and security men, to include intellectuals, Christians, and
foreign tourists, in addition to innocent citizens whose lives were not
taken into consideration by the violent plans of Islamist groups.
 3.  The failure of political parties to absorb the changes and consecutive
political defeats took place in the last decades; and their failure to
express the prospects of the new generations, and to provide alternative
policies other than those adopted by the ruling party, and create
appropriate frameworks that would achieve the aspiration towards
justice.
 4.  The over concern by the current political regime about the international
public opinion, particularly about its image in front of the world.
 5.  The escalation of the international human rights movement, and its
concern about Egypt and its human rights situation, given its relative
weight in the region; and showing solidarity and cooperation with the
human rights movement in Egypt.
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Over a period of about fifteen years, the human rights movement in Egypt
has witnessed a huge development in terms of quantity and quality.  The
continuos work of the EOHR has led to produce scores of cadres who are
equipped with the professional skills needed to manage work in the field
of human rights.  This has contributed to the birth of many institutions
that work in specialized fields, side by side with the EOHR.  They all
adopt international human rights standards as reference to their work.
This development of the human rights movement has allowed its
activities to cover different tasks in the human rights field such as
monitoring, observing, documenting, and reporting on human rights
violations, providing legal support and judicial assistance for victims of
human rights violations, helping in the rehabilitation of the victims of
torture, as well as providing training and education to disseminate the
human rights culture.  There have also been organizations which defend
the rights of specific groups such as labors, women, farmers, and
prisoners.  Similarly, there have been organizations more concerned with
conducting specialized studies and research in the human rights field, and
dealing with the problems that hamper ingraining the human rights
principles in the Egyptian society.
Major among the non-governmental institutions working in the field of
human rights and women, other than the Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights, are:
 1.  The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS):  It was
established in 1993, and works on the level of the Arab region.  It aims
at educating and promoting the human rights culture in Arab countries
through its research, academic, and intellectual activities, and through
analyzing the problems which hamper the application of international
human rights law.  It pays special attention to training and education in
the field of human rights.
 2.  The Group for Democratic Development (GDD): It was established in
1996 with the aim of improving the performance of the legislative
institution (the Parliament) in order to be able to support the
democratic development.  It also aims at the promotion of democratic
concepts and thoughts in the society, and at widening the scope of
political participation.
 3.  The Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal
Profession (ACIJLP): It was founded in 1997, and works as a regional
center.  It aims at organizing and mobilizing for support for judges and
lawyers, raising the awareness of the constitutional and international
safeguards provided for them, and supporting the independence of the48
judiciary and the legal profession as basic fundamentals for the
promotion of human rights.
 4.  The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRCAP): It
was founded in 1997.  It monitors the condition of prisons, and offer
legal assistance to prisoners and detainees.  It works for the
amelioration of the prisoners’ living, health, and social conditions.
 5.  The Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA): It was
founded in 1994.  It aims to develop women’s awareness of their
rights, conducts studies on discrimination against women, and provides
legal assistance to women.
 6.  The Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR):  It was established
in 1996, and aims to reinforce women’s rights in political participation.
It also offers legal assistance and advice to women, raises their
awareness of the importance of their political participation.
 7.  Al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and
Torture :  It aims to rehabilitate the victims of violence, and build
strong relations with organizations and individuals who deal with the
victims of violence to coordinate efforts on behalf of the victims, and
conduct research and studies on various forms of violence, and its
reasons.
 8.  The Center for Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS): It was
founded in 1990.  It aims to defend the social and economic rights of
workers, and raise their skills with the hope of realizing a democratic
society where all members participate in the decision making process
and in the conduct of its affairs, a society which defends the
democratic, economic, and social rights of its citizens, and protects the
freedom and independence of trade unions.
 9.  Hisham Mubarak Center for Law:  It was founded in 1999 to continue
the mission for which the Center for Human Rights Legal Aid had
been established in 1994.  This is to provide legal and judicial
assistance and advice for victims of human rights violations, and to try
to change and develop the legal structures which conflict with human
rights, through suggesting alternative draft laws, or challenging the
constitutionality of the laws conflicting with human rights.
  10.   Land Center for Human Rights:  It was founded in 1996.  It monitors
the violations committed against the rights of farmers and agricultural
laborers. It also monitors the problems related to the pollution of the
environment.
6
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These centers were established as civil companies in order to fall under
the protection of the civil law, and avoid the firm restrictions and
pressures imposed by the associations law, which gives the administration
broad power over non-governmental organizations, and allows it to
undermine their activities away from the government intervention.
In addition to the above mentioned organizations, there are a number of
development associations which have activities related to raising the
awareness of human rights.  Major among them are:
1. The Association of Upper Egypt for Education and Development
(AUPED): It has 36 free primary schools affiliated to it (35 of which are
in Upper Egypt).  They include about 10 thousand students.  It
implements two programs related to human rights:
- The first is civil education for children.  It is directed to school students,
and aims to raise their awareness of the rights of the child.  A child-rights
group is formed in each school to work like a small parliament which
helps in directing the school affairs, by applying what the children have
learnt about their rights.
- The second program is directed to youth centers in seven governorates.
It aims to raise the awareness of human rights and the importance of
political participation.  The program is managed in a way that would
build strong ties between the target groups (children and youth) and their
local community, and urge them to play active roles in improving
environmental, health, and social conditions in their communities.
Both programs include activities that raise the awareness of human rights,
the rights of women and children, and of the role of civil society.
 2.  The Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CESO): It
focuses on issues related to the rights of the child within its
development activities.  It organizes training sessions on these topics,
for teachers of its schools, and the staff of the children’s clubs
affiliated to it.  It has been a pioneer in implementing development
projects which focus on both improving health and social conditions in
poor areas, and raising the awareness of the rights of women and
children.  It was able to realize leading achievements in this field,
perhaps major among them has been the initial taken by an Egyptian
village to prevent the practice of Female Genital Mutilation, and
issuing a collective document to this effect in 1992.   This event was a
subject of a field study conducted by the Cairo Institute for Human50
Rights Studies.  The findings of this unique experience were issued in a
book in both Arabic and English.
The organization second concern is raising the awareness of human rights
issues, their reflection on the development of civil society, and the
relation with the others with different religion.  It achieves this goal
through organizing conferences which gather intellectual elite, and those
concerned with human rights and the development of civil society, as
well as representatives of main religious authorities.
 3.  Caritas (An Egyptian association affiliated to the international
organization Caritas): It undertakes an ambitious program to eradicate
illiteracy from Egypt, which exceeds 50%.
This association is mainly concerned with literacy, not in its limited sense
of learning how to read and write, but it is extended to provide students
with general cultural, health and social knowledge.  This includes
knowledge about the environment, women’s reproductive rights, and
female genital mutilation.  The size of this program could be featured if
we realize that its beneficiaries in 1998 alone reached 15,320 participants
from 10 governorantes, mostly from Upper Egypt.
Generally, it can be said that over the last decade, the Egyptian human
rights movement has become a major fact in the daily political life in
Egypt, and the resort which parties, groups, and individuals seek
whenever a gross human rights violation takes place, looking forward to
its announced statements.  Moreover, the security bodies frequently look
forward to the statements which condemns  the violations committed by
violent Islamist groups.  In addition, the human rights vocabulary started
to appear in the headlines of main newspapers, whether governmental or
opposition.  Human rights organizations have become ‘houses’ to receive
complaints by ordinary citizens from the grievances of every day life. The
circle of complainers has even expanded to include police men.
The impact of this influence on the government can be summed up by
saying that it has become more aware that disregarding human rights will
have an accumulative effect on its record inside the country, and harm its
image outside it.  This fact has been reflected in a number of practices,
such as paying attention to human rights concepts and language in the
political discourse of statesmen; creating two human rights offices: one in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one in the office of the Public
Prosecutor; teaching human rights in some university faculties; and
removing items of religious intolerance from school curricula.51
On anther level, the increasing influence of the movement on people can
be detected in that observing human rights has become a focal aspect in
assessing the government performance.  It can also be noticed in the
revision taking place by various political trends, including the Muslim
Brothers, of the consistence of their stances with the human rights
principles
7.  Moreover, an increasing tendency by political parities can
even be noticed towards adopting the demands raised by human rights
organizations as part of the parities agenda for legislative, constitutional
and electoral reforms.
In fact, the role played by human rights organizations in monitoring and
documenting human rights violations has widely disclosed the
government human rights record to local the public opinion.  On basis of
the reports of these organizations, particularly the EOHR, the Egyptian
parliament witnessed a form of ‘hearing’ of the government’s abusive
practices took place in 1989, particularly regarding its expansion in the
use of administrative detention, which took place by virtue of the
emergency law, and the speared of the use of torture, collective
punishment, and extrajudicial killing.  As part of the EOHR’s campaign
against torture launched in December 1991, an independent member of
the parliament interpellated the Minister of the Interior at that time about
the spread of torture in Egypt.  In this interpellation, the MP relied on
long extracts of the relevant EOHR reports.  Thus, the cabinet then was
forced to discuss this issue in one of its meetings under the title: “false
allegations of not observing human rights principles.”  In this regard, the
cabinet decided to form a ministerial committee made of representatives
of the ministries of the interior, justice, foreign affairs, and information to
refute these ‘allegations.’ The Minister of the Interior at that time
announced that he is ready to open the prisons for visits by human rights
organizations to listen to the complaints of prisoners.  Subsequently, the
U.S. based Human Rights Watch was allowed to visit six Egyptian
prisons to investigate their conditions.  This is although an application by
this same organization to visit Egyptian prisons had been denied two
years before by the ministry of the interior
8.
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Also, the opposition in the parliament, though of little weight, relies on
the reports of human rights organizations when the extension of the state
of emergency is discussed in the parliament.
In addition, the efforts of human rights organizations, combined with the
struggle of the Journalists Syndicate, succeeded in confronting law no. 93
of 1995 known as ‘the law to assassinate the Press.’ In the face of these
efforts, the authorities had to revoke the law one year after its
promulgation.
Moreover, the institutions specialized in offering legal assistance to
victims of human rights violations have offered this legal service to
thousands of people, which led in many of the cases to revoking abusive
decisions against the victims.  This has been particularly true with cases
when certain individuals were persecuted for their syndical activities, and
in cases related to abusive dismissal or collective dismissal of workers.
In many cases, a compensation was obtained to the victims of torture,
victims of the use of force in dispersing peaceful assemblies, and victims
of abusive dismissal from work.
The tool of offering legal assistance allowed human rights organizations
to challenge the constitutionality of many legal provisions which conflict
with human rights principles.  These challenges, which are related to the
freedom of unions, freedom of opinion and expression, and equality
between the people before law, are still being heard by the Supreme
Constitutional Court.
On the international level, the Egyptian human rights movement
succeeded in building a broad network of international relations which
enabled it to enjoy good respect on the international level.  The
international support with the Egyptian human rights movement has
contributed to reinforcing its role in confronting human rights violations,
and in taking human rights activists out of prisons in many occasions.
This support also increased the financial resources of Egyptian human
rights institutions, particularly in light of the legal restrictions imposed on
collecting local donations on the one hand, and the lack of general
awareness of human rights on the other.  These resources also enabled
human rights institutions to give special attention to training and raising
the skills of the workers in the field of human rights, and to raising legal
awareness, and implementing educational programs on human rights
9.
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Due to the high professional performance of the human rights movement,
and its impartiality in different situations, the reports issued by human
rights institutions have become a reliable source for international
organizations.  Moreover, their annual reports have become the base upon
which human rights conditions in Egypt are evaluated.
Little by little, human rights organizations gain more experience in
dealing with international human rights instruments.  This experience was
clear in the reports made by the EOHR in 1993, to be parallel to the
government’s reports.  This was when the UN Human Rights Committee
was discussing the Egyptian government report on the progress achieved
in putting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into
effect; and when the UN Committee Against Torture was discussing the
government report on its commitment to the provisions of the Convention
Against Torture.  These discussions clearly revealed that the experts in
both committees relied on the reports of the EOHR, which included
documented information, and successful selection of examples of the
legal structure, which legalize human rights violations or secure impunity
to perpetrators of torture.  It is clear, as well, that the United Nations
special raportuers rely on the reports of the Egyptian human rights
organizations in the annual reports these raportuers make to address the
Egyptian government.
However, the Egyptian human rights movement has developed its work
mechanisms by learning from the experiences and mechanisms of the
international human rights movement.  On the other hand, the interaction
with the international human rights movement has drawn the attention
that it is important for international organizations to give special attention
to the violations committed by non-governmental parties.  In its
recommendations presented to the World Conference for Human Rights
held in Vienna in 1993, the EOHR called on the United Nations to give
special attention to the fact that non-governmental groups, who are not
accountable before the state or before the international community,
commit gross violations of human rights such as assassination, organized
killing, sectarian massacres, taking hostages, and attacking properties.
The EOHR stressed the increasing need that the UN adopt a stance in this
regard based on the provisions of article five of the International
                                                                                                                                                                     
region in cooperating with it in preparing a project on an educational human rights guide for primary
and secondary schools.  It was part of a UNESCO project to make a unified guide which take into
consideration various cultures of geographic regions in the world.
The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, as well, organizes annual educational courses for its old
and new members (more than two thousands), on the characteristics of the struggle for human rights,
and international instruments to protect these rights.54
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which does not give “….any State,
group, or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein…..”
It must be noted here that the contributions made by the Cairo Institute
for Human Rights Studies to the assessment of the effectiveness of the
human rights movement on the local, Arab, and international levels, has
resulted in the first international project to be made by the center.  This is
to search for new strategies for the international human rights movement
to confront the challenges it faces
10.  The project will start in the Arab
region first in the year 2000.
Relation with the Government:
The government refused to give legal status to the mother organization -
the EOHR - for over one and a half decades.  It challenged the legitimacy
of other human rights institutions which were founded as civil companies.
The human rights institutions tried to keep the channels of dialogue open
with the government, on the grounds that this dialogue is an inevitable
approach to realize tangible progress in the human rights field.  However,
the government did not pay any attention to this dialogue and its
channels.  In this respect, it is enough to point out that in 1994 and 1995,
the EOHR sent more than 1200 letter to the authorities, but received only
80 replies in this period.  Also, in 1997 alone, the number of letters and
notifications sent by the EOHR to the authorities reached 1221, and it
received only 46 replies in that year.  In 1998, the EOHR sent more than
1400 letters to the concerned authorities, and received only 42 replies.
This refrain by the authorities continues although on following the EOHR
newsletter, one can notice that the government replies are highly
welcomed.
11
The Egyptian authorities always try to isolate human right institutions
from their society, whether by imposing news blackout on their activities,
or by trying to discredit them before the public opinion by accusing them
of defending terrorists, causing disunity in the nation, harming the
country’s image by the reports they disseminate on human rights
violations, or saying that they are a tool to harm the supreme national
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194.
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The EOHR annual report in 1997, and the EOHR annual report in 1998.55
interests. The situation could reach the level of seizing the activities of
these institutions by preventing them from holding an extended meeting
outside their offices, hosting conferences of regional and  international
nature, or by hampering the training and educational sessions they hold.
With this hostile stance by the authorities, human rights activists and
leaders were not safe from harassment and torture for their defense for
human rights.
In this regard, and in the wake of the solidarity expressed by the EOHR
with the iron and steel worker who were detained and tortured for
organizing a peaceful strike in August 1989, the authorities detained
scores of people, including two members of the EOHR board of trustees,
and a number of its members who, directly after their arrest, were tortured
and ill treated.  They were then released as a result of a local and
international campaign for solidarity with them
12.
In February 1990, the authorities arrested a third member of the EOHR
board, who was exposed to intensive torture over ten days at the State
Security Investigations at Lazoughli
13.
In another event, following the EOHR report on collective punishment
and torture of large number of citizens in Koshah village in August 1998,
and amidst a war-like environment in which workers in the human rights
field were accused by newspapers of being betrayals, the public
prosecution ordered the preventive detention of the EOHR’ secretary
general pending investigations.  He faced accusations included
disseminating false news with the aim of harming the country’s image
and interests, and receiving funds and donations without permission form
the concerned authorities.  The detention of the secretary general and
interrogating him took place only few days before the international
celebration of the 50
th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the adoption by the UN of the first document on the
protection of the rights of human rights defenders!
A broad solidarity campaign, locally and internationally, was then
launched and led to the release on a bail of the EOHR secretary general
six days after his arrest.  The case has not, however, been closed so that
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the accusations remain a hanging sword on the officials of the EOHR to
be used at any time.
However, this hostile attitude by the government towards human rights
activities, and denying legal status to institutions working in this field, are
not enough to explain the limited influence of the human rights
movement, and the decreasing circle of the future of its message, and the
scope of the people influenced by it.  Other factors have added to this
situation such as the lack of democratic values in the political prevalent
culture, particularly in light of the chronic forfeit of free political life for
more than two decades under the name of social justice, national
independence, and facing outside challenges.  Also among these factors
has been the bad reputation given to the human rights idea, specially
among the progressive and leftist trends who considered human rights as
an American tool to disunite the national Arab ties, and the socialist bases
from inside.  This fear increased in early eighties when the signs of the
collapse of the socialist states of Eastern Europe appeared.57
Conclusion
The principal of participation is the dominant factor in the UN
Declaration on the Right and Development.
14 We can even say that the
right to participation is the essence of the right to development, which
means that the right to development is considered as more of a political
than an economic process. This is clearly indicated by the five articles in
the declaration, that is half the Declaration, which consists of ten articles.
These articles are 1,2,6,8 and 10.
In the first article of the Declaration, the right to development is
presented as the right of all human beings and people to “participation”,
and taking part in the achievement of economic, social and cultural
development and the attainment of the development. Development, in this
sense, is not a technical economic process, but it is also political and
depends on participation to achieve it and enjoy its results. It is not only
the collective responsibility of peoples but, also concerns individuals:
“every human being”.
The second article stipulates that the human being is “the subject of the
development” and should therefore be an active partner in, and
beneficiary of the right. To this end, the Declaration speaks of the
inevitable need for an appropriate political system for development and
affirms that development policies, aimed at achieving prosperity for all
the population and all individuals, should be based on the free, active and
purposeful participation in development and the fair distribution of the
ensuring benefits.
Article 6 refers to the difficulty of exercising the right to development
without taking into consideration civil and political rights, the
fundamental freedom, and equality without discrimination. The Preamble
of the Declaration refers to obstacles existed to the development of
human beings and peoples, and mainly the denial of political and civil
rights.
Article 8 stipulates that people’s participation should be taken to
implement factor in development.
Article 10 asserts that legislative measures and policies should be taken to
implement to development.
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It is noteworthy that the reports of the World Bank, the world Health
Organization and the United Nations have endorsed this concept and
closely link the right to a decent human life to the political and cultural
factors in such a life. The last Human Development Report issued by the
United Nations Development Program has stretched the definition of
poverty to include the inability to exercise human rights and political
rights and lack of dignity, confidence and self-respect. In the Human
Development Report issues in 1991, the UNDP affirms that a high degree
of participation in an essential element in any political process that is of
benefit to the poor and encouraging the independence of citizens is an end
in itself and participation is the way to guarantee the availability and
fairer distribution of goods and services. The participation of people in
decision-making will make policies and projects more realistic, pragmatic
and sustainable.
15
In his report for 1997, Jose Pengois, the Reporter for the UN Human
Rights Committee notes that, although the economies of the distribution
of national income in these countries, which continued to suffer from a
great disparity between minority and the poor masses.
16
Economic growth alone does not guarantee the exercise of economic and
social rights, to say nothing of civil and political rights. This depends on
the division of power and the distribution of benefits.
17
Jack Donnelly says the poverty is not only an economic phenomenon but
also a political one, in a time of plenty. The violation of civil and political
rights generally takes place in order to protect economic privileges. The
elite that dominates the political mechanisms which distance people,
make exceptions and ensure hegemony generally practices the violation
of economic and social rights.
18
The views of Egyptian development experts point in the same direction:
economic growth alone is not enough to limit poverty, unless the poor
“participate” in the fruits of such growth, that is to have a say in the
process of “distribution.” This necessitates “community participation” in
all development stages
19. This in turn requires a balance between various
groups in society (preventing any group/s from dominating the others),
transparency and accountability, which is unperceivable without
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18 ibid.
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information being accessible to all, or what the 1996 Egypt Human
Development Report calls “enjoying the same level of knowledge.”
20
The report adds that it is difficult to design anti-poverty policies and
programs without knowing how the poor in a certain society think of their
livelihood. Thus the report calls for letting the poor “express themselves”
as one of the ways to “empower” them
21. Another means of
empowerment is that “those who stand in defense of the poor have more
influence on public policy in Egypt;”
22 such defenders as “human rights
and environmentalist organizations that have come to play a vital role in
discussions on the ways to alleviate poverty.”
23
When development experts mention the necessity of transparency and
knowledge they are indirectly speaking of safeguarding the right to the
unfettered freedom of circulating information and exchanging views.
When they mention the importance of accountability they are pointing at
the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, which presuppose
the rights to vote, to be elected, and to form political parties, unions and
associations – the rights that make for an effective civil society. Another
precondition is that the administrative should not tyrannize over the
legislature or the judiciary and prevent them from overseeing it on behalf
of society. They are in short the basic essentials for the enjoyment of
human rights.
This is the same conclusion reached by the group of authors of The
Wisdom of the Egyptians issued in late 1999 that was awarded by the
General Book Organization as one of the best books in 1999. The book,
offering a rereading of Egypt’s history, concludes that there are five main
approaches to a better 21
st century Egypt, namely:
1- Human development.
2- Skipping the earlier techno-industrial stages and immediately entering
the field of high technology.
3- Political development.
4- Civil society and unbridling public voluntary initiatives.
5-  Symbiotic society.
In the very last paragraph, the author underscores the necessity of
embarking concurrently on two indispensable routes towards the
advancement of Egyptian society. Firstly, reinforcing national
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integration; secondly, “that all Egyptians enjoy their human rights, that
their dignity be resuscitated, and that their public and private liberties be
safeguarded both in legislation and in practice.”
24
In a recent comparative study on the relation between the state and
development in Egypt and five other developing countries
25, Hassanein
Tawfiq notes that corruption has become one of the main problems in
Egypt
26. Another problem is the increasing imbalances in the distribution
of the returns of development since the beginning of the nineties: regional
imbalance increased (poverty level in some parts of Upper Egypt reaches
70%), the gap between social classes and strata grew larger, and the
middle class continued to decline. The author stresses that the distribution
of the burdens and fruits of development is “a political process in the first
place.”
Tawfiq further argues that activating the role of the Egyptian state in
development requires “comprehensive reform on the constitutional, legal,
political, institutional and administrative levels.” Such reform
necessitates the following: “annulling the Emergency Law and other
exceptional laws restricting citizens’ rights and freedoms;” putting an end
to the transgressions by the executive and the legislative powers against
the independence of the judiciary; and “reforming the electoral system.”
It also requires reforming the party system by dropping the legal
restrictions on forming political parties and on their activities, and
amending the laws that restrain the work of syndicates and NGOs and
impact adversely on their role in development.
In the end the author affirms that Egypt has no other choice; focusing on
economic reform only would is not a solution to Egypt’s problems, on the
contrary it might provide new fountainheads of political and social
violence. “In short, the Egyptian state on the brink of the 21
st century
finds itself at crossroads: the first option is to initiate serious and
systematic reform that would enable the state machine and its political
and non-political institutions to deal effectively with internal and external
variables and new changes. The second is to continue to palliate problems
by partial solutions and patched-up policies, which means that Egypt
would enter into the 21
st century encumbered with acute social problems
that constitute a cause for the persistence of political and social
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congestion, extremism, violence and crime on the internal level and
dependency on the external level.
To avoid such a scenario, it would not be enough to focus on economic
reform; political and social reform is incumbent. This is especially so
given the notable growth of civil society institutions and forces and the
remarkable increase in the number of youths banging the doors of politics
seeking participation and aspiring to better livelihood. Unless such
energies, which constitute the real capital of the Egyptian states, were
assimilated within a state-led project for revival and development (whose
ultimate aim is to provide the essentials of dignified living), they would
be channeled into activities and organizations that threaten political and
social peace.
Now, is there a political will to take the road of reform and shoulder its
implications? This is the real challenge.”
27
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